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The United States has in many ways set the global standard for agricultural innovation. And 
China, for its part, has made significant 
strides in agricultural productivity 
as well. China continues to rapidly 
integrate innovations from abroad, 
while also developing homegrown 
innovations. But is the rate of 
agricultural innovation adoption 
sufficiently rapid to meet the growing 
food needs of a huge and increasingly 
wealthy population?  
The average family in the United States 
today spends about 10 percent of 
its income on food, and that figure 
is double in China. Both of these 
figures have declined over time—in 
the United States over an extended 
period, and in China more dramatically 
in the last 30 years. When families 
spend less of their income on food, it 
represents a relative gain in prosperity 
as disposable income can then be 
spent on other necessities, leisure, or 
luxury items. 
This decline in food prices is directly 
related to the rise of agricultural 
productivity over the last 30 years. 
And the main factor responsible for 
such significant gains is innovation, 
not just previous gains from input 
intensification and crop-area 
expansion. It takes significantly 
fewer resources today to produce 
one calorie of food than it did in the 
Executive Summary 
past, with much of the credit for 
that improvement attributable to 
agricultural innovation.  
For this reason, investment in 
agricultural research and development 
(R&D) will be important. But while 
both the US and Chinese public sectors 
invest in such R&D, it is private sector 
investment that will determine the 
ultimate effect of future agricultural 
innovations, especially in the United 
States, which remains an innovation 
and commercial leader.
This raises an important question 
for both countries: Are there 
opportunities to link private sector 
investment activity in agricultural 
innovation and thereby connect the 
US and Chinese agricultural innovation 
engines? 
This paper suggests four models that 
could link US and Chinese investment 
and yield productive new avenues 
for commercial collaboration. All four 
models focus on animal protein supply 
chain technologies. That is because 
agricultural innovation in this realm is 
of particular importance to demand-
side developments and to rapidly 
changing consumption patterns in 
China. 
These four models focus on early-
stage agricultural innovation and 
business development. In the United 
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but personnel with deep experience 
in, and perspective on, Chinese 
agriculture would help bring unique 
capacity to the fund’s portfolio 
companies. The goal would be to help 
them scale portfolio businesses in both 
the United States and China.
Model Two: Joint Agriculture 
Accelerator
In this model, Chinese investors would 
partner with a US-based organization 
to start a US-China agriculture 
accelerator. Such an accelerator would 
provide participating businesses with 
office, laboratory, and/or engineering 
space, as well as access to mentors, 
skills training, a support network, and 
ultimately connections to investors 
and customers. The joint accelerator 
would, as is customary, often take 
an equity stake in businesses that 
participate in the program.  
Model Three: University Student 
Incubators
In this model, US and Chinese investors 
would help create student incubators 
at US universities, with the explicit goal 
of supporting development of startup 
businesses created by teams of both 
US and Chinese university students. 
Startup businesses that emerge from 
the incubator would have market 
potential in both countries.
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
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States, funding for such opportunities, 
especially as new technology moves to 
commercialization, is provided largely 
by private capital. The public sector 
certainly plays a role in American 
agricultural innovation by funding 
basic research, universities, and a host 
of federal and state-level programs 
that support early-stage business 
development, but private capital and 
financial markets fuel most technology 
commercialization in US agriculture, as 
well as other markets.
In China, of course, public capital plays 
a considerably greater role than in 
the United States, and agriculture is 
no exception. But domestic financial 
markets are evolving quickly in China, 
so there are new opportunities to 
leverage private capital for outbound 
investment—or public-private 
partnerships among Chinese market 
and corporate players in agriculture. 
In short, the opportunities highlighted 
in this paper emphasize private capital, 
but various configurations could be 
appropriate for US-China collaboration 
in the four models.
Model One: Joint Agriculture 
Opportunities Fund 
Such a fund, backed by US and Chinese 
equity partners, would have an explicit 
focus on investing in businesses with 
technology relevant to both the US 
and Chinese animal protein supply 
chains. Chinese investors would be 
limited partners in the fund itself, 
development is a pressing need. One 
opportunity that stands out is the 
prospect of investment in greenfield 
agriculture projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Such a fund would aim to 
discover projects where mutual 
participation would benefit the 
Africa-based project but also build 
opportunities for participating US and 
Chinese agribusiness partners. 
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
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Model Four: Emerging Africa 
Agriculture Fund
This model would bring Chinese 
and US investors (and potentially 
third-country investors) together as 
partners, as well as agribusinesses 
from both countries, that are active 
in third countries where agricultural 
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
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Introduction
The average American family today spends about 10 percent of its income on food, down from 25 
percent in 1930. The proportion of 
income spent by Chinese families has 
also fallen, from an average of over 50 
percent in the early 1990s to about 20 
percent today.1  
Rising overall income and food 
consumption patterns all have an effect 
on average food expenditure, but they 
are also inherently tied to agricultural 
productivity. In general, if agricultural 
productivity rises, all other things 
being constant, food expenditures as a 
proportion of income will fall. Increased 
agricultural output can arise from two 
sources: (1) utilization of more inputs, 
such as land and fertilizer, to increase 
output, or (2) higher productivity 
obtained from each unit of input used. 
Innovation plays a central role in the 
second source, since new products,
services, and business methods drive 
productivity higher.
In China and across other emerging 
markets, gains in agricultural 
productivity after the 1960s were driven 
by input intensification and crop-area 
expansion. But during the last twenty-
five years, the pattern shifted in China 
because agricultural productivity gains 
came to be driven largely by input 
efficiency from innovation. 
Economists measure this efficiency 
through Total Factor Productivity (TFP)—
the ratio of total output to total inputs 
in a production process. Unsurprisingly, 
China, starting from a much lower base, 
has significantly outpaced the United 
States in agricultural output growth on a 
percentage basis (see Figure 1). 
The majority of agricultural output 
growth in China before the 1990s was 
driven by higher input use, such as the 
Figure 1. Average Annual Agricultural Output Growth by Decade
Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service, International Agricultural Productivity data product. 
use of land, fertilizer, pesticides, and 
irrigation. Since 1990, however, China 
has driven the majority of its agricultural 
output expansion through improved 
efficiencies as measured by TFP. The 
United States again offers a contrast: 
over the past three decades, it has 
derived all of its growth in agricultural 
output from higher efficiency and 
has actually decreased its input use. 
This trend reflects the shift away from 
reliance on fertilizer and pesticide inputs 
to investments in genetic engineering 
and other high-tech improvements that 
have increased yields and productivity 
with fewer units of input.
China’s TFP growth in agriculture 
has arisen primarily from technical 
progress rather than from efficiency 
improvement.2 In other words, adoption 
of newer technologies has improved 
production, but those technologies have 
not been used to their full potential. 
Early adopters of technology may lack 
experience in exploiting its full potential 
and achieving high levels of efficiency 
with the new technology. For instance, 
an improved seed variety may increase 
crop yield, but the full yield potential of 
that seed will not be realized without 
proper agronomic practices. 
But that is not all. Productivity growth 
in Chinese agriculture is also highly 
divergent by geography. Wealthier 
provinces tend to have experienced 
more prolonged and sharper advances 
in agricultural production and efficiency 
than have poorer provinces.3 Scale 
efficiencies have, in fact, been flat or 
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What is Innovation? 
Innovation is a new method or new product 
that becomes a new practice somewhere 
in the world. The idea or the technology 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
to achieve innovation with broad effects.  
Innovation is about both the idea and how 
it becomes a commercial reality. The gap 
between an idea, invention, or technology 
and a commercially viable product is huge.  
Innovation is a process that carries something 
from conception to development and from 
commercialization to market penetration.  
Three ideas to consider regarding innovation 
include the following: 
1. Entrepreneurial creativity and innova-
tion is not usually about something that 
is entirely new to the world. Rather, 
innovation and invention is most typical-
ly about a re-combination of ideas, a 
melding of old things into some kind of 
new combination.
2. Innovation cannot be foreseen with 
significant clarity, and is usually not 
predictable. Transformative innovations 
are most often surprises that have aris-
en from an unlikely journey of single or 
small group of entrepreneurial people. 
3. Innovation results from a collective 
intelligence, the cumulative ideas and 
knowledge of many people that have 
combined in unique ways over time. 
People exchange ideas and become spe-
cialists in increasingly complex trades 
and arts. This idea-sharing between 
people over the course of time results in 
a store of knowledge that can be iterat-
ed to drive further innovation.
actually deteriorated in many parts of 
China, reflecting issues related to small 
landholdings. This poses a fundamental 
challenge for Chinese agriculture 
because agricultural technologies 
are often directly related to scale 
efficiencies.
In one sense, the United States has 
natural advantages in agricultural 
production: the country has a relative 
abundance of natural resources, 
namely land and water. For instance, 
the United States has more than twice 
the arable land area of China, yet China 
must feed more than four times the US 
population on 
that smaller land 
base. Having done 
so successfully 
is a remarkable 
achievement and 
speaks volumes 
about the resourcefulness of Chinese 
agriculture. Yet China’s comparative 
disadvantage in the natural resources 
necessary to expand food production 
means that it has all the more reason 
to rely heavily on technology and 
innovation to address existing and latent 
challenges.
Viewed through this prism, a central 
question for China is whether the rate 
of adoption of agricultural innovations 
is sufficient. Gazing into the future, as 
millions more Chinese join the urban 
middle class, significant pressures will 
inevitably be placed on agriculture 
to feed China’s population. A shift to 
diets heavier in animal protein has 
already begun to create a dramatic rise 
in demand for feed ingredients, from 
grains to oilseeds. So, even assuming 
conservative estimates, growth in 
Chinese meat consumption over the 
next decade will affect agriculture by 
increasing global consumption of beef 
by 25 percent, chicken by 20 percent, 
and pork by 15 percent.4  
This means that although China’s degree 
of self sufficiency in meat and grain 
consumption remains controversial and 
hotly debated, the sheer magnitude 
of ongoing demand shifts in China will 
lead to an “all of the above” approach 
to securing stable 
agricultural supply 
needs. Put simply, 
China needs rapidly 
increasing production, 
as well as increased 
production in other 
countries that export various agricultural 
commodities to China. Otherwise, 
China will not be able to meet this new 
demand and mitigate broader impacts 
on global prices.
Beyond China, other emerging 
economies, particularly those in Asia, 
are undergoing similar phenomena—
rising incomes, urbanization, and 
the emergence of middle-class food 
consumption habits. The United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
projects that global food production 
must double over the next 40 years 
to satisfy increasing demand due to 
population growth and rising economic 
prosperity. These figures have framed 
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
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The United States has more than twice the 
arable land area of China, yet China must feed 
more than four times the US population on that 
smaller land base.
the discussion of what is needed to feed 
a global population that is expected to 
balloon by another 36 percent to 9.5 
billion in 2050.5  
There is limited opportunity to expand 
the land used in agricultural production 
because it is fixed. So to sustainably 
increase food production, innovation 
in agricultural technologies will be 
required that both raises productivity 
and improves the efficiency and 
resiliency of existing and emerging agri-
food systems.
As two of the most important global 
agricultural powers, the United States 
and China will play an important role in 
shaping global agricultural production 
and demand patterns and tackling 
attendant challenges. 
This paper explores innovation in 
agriculture. Specifically, its aim is 
to present distinctive opportunities 
for joint collaboration, based on 
investment and commercial solutions, 
to address the rising pressures on global 
agriculture.
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
6
The last two centuries have been marked by a global shift away from agrarian economies and toward 
the acceleration of economic exchange 
and specialization. This is generally 
considered to be the basic foundation 
upon which modern prosperity has 
been built. Such was possible because 
dramatic improvements in agricultural 
productivity and yield freed up labor 
to be deployed into other economic 
activities. 
As recently as the nineteenth century, 
more than half of all human labor hours 
were dedicated to one task: weeding. 
Farming technology and pesticides 
have radically altered this, and keeping 
the stomach full is no longer an all-
consuming preoccupation. This has 
allowed the individual to divert his 
or her resources and time to other 
endeavors, including trade, business, 
and other worthwhile enterprises.   
The United States has played an 
important role in this process of 
agricultural innovation. It is, to be 
sure, difficult to attribute any one 
innovation to a single person or place, 
but important categories of commercial 
advancements in agriculture that 
emerged largely from the United States 
include farm machinery, pesticides, 
hybrid seed, genetic modification and 
cloning, and precision agriculture, 
among others.  
Using current US population and 
farm figures, the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) reports that each 
American farm feeds 155 people (using 
only US population, even though the 
country is a net agricultural exporter), 
a tenfold jump from 1930 (see 
Figure 2). Even this figure, however, 
underestimates the productivity gains 
made by most US farms. The 2012 
Census shows that there are about 
Agricultural Innovation in the United States
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Figure 2. Number of People Fed by One US Farm
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Source: USDA
155,000 farms that sell $500,000 or 
more annually, and these farms account 
for 80 percent of total farm sales. If 
155,000 farms feed 80 percent of the 
US population, then each of these farms 
feeds, on average, 1,625 people, none of 
whom plays a direct role in the primary 
production of that food.
 
Corn is an agricultural commodity 
that well illustrates these tremendous 
American productivity gains and 
efficiencies derived from agricultural 
innovation.
Ideas about the potential yield gains 
from heterosis, or hybrid vigor, arose 
from Mendelian genetics in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Much research took place 
at US universities to further the 
notion. And in short order, agricultural 
entrepreneurs forged a new industry—
seed—and then pushed these ideas into 
commercial reality with the introduction 
of double cross, and then eventually 
single cross, hybrids. 
Adoption of hybrid corn by US farmers 
from 1930 to 1955 became a template 
for understanding and incorporating 
agricultural technology, using a model 
that stretched from early adopters, 
to early majority, to late majority and 
ultimately to adoption by laggards.6  
More recently, the addition of molecular 
modification techniques (biotechnology) 
to traditional plant breeding has 
commercially introduced traits such as 
herbicide resistance, insect resistance, 
and drought tolerance. The net result 
of corn breeding innovation has been 
steadily rising yields (see Figure 3).
In addition, the resource efficiency of 
corn continues to improve. While yield 
has risen, the environmental impact of 
growing corn has decreased (see Figure 
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Figure 3. Historic US Corn Yields (bushels/acre) 
Source: USDA
4). One study found that between 1980 
and 2011, while US corn yield (bushels 
per acre) increased 64 percent, per 
bushel land use decreased 30 percent, 
per bushel soil erosion decreased 67 
percent, per bushel irrigation water 
applied decreased 53 percent, per 
bushel energy use decreased 44 
percent, and per bushel greenhouse 
gas emissions decreased 36 percent.7  
In other words, the United States 
managed, quite remarkably, to produce 
more with less.  
US hybrid corn also illustrates how 
innovations result from the work of 
many people—and how collective 
knowledge can lead to dramatic impacts 
over time. 
The success of hybrid corn through 
the decades rightfully owes credit 
to many influential people, with a 
leading example being Henry Wallace, 
an entrepreneur, two-time cabinet 
secretary, and Vice President of the 
United States during the third term 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Many others 
also played important roles, including 
university and government scientists, 
extension personnel, entrepreneurs, 
corporate scientists and business 
people, and foreigners.   
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Figure 4. Per Bushel Resource Impacts to Produce Corn for Grain, 1980-2011
Source:  Field to Market 2012
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Agricultural Innovation in China
As in the United States, the story of agriculture is woven through China’s history. But the 
development of modern agricultural 
practices and the adoption of 
innovations is a newer and still evolving 
phenomenon. 
Change in Chinese agriculture has been 
driven by continued growth in consumer 
food markets.  For example, the Chinese 
grocery sector is forecast to reach sales 
of almost $1.5 trillion by 2015, having 
surpassed US grocery sales in 2011.8 
In 1980, at the 
beginning of the 
economic reform 
era, agriculture 
accounted for 40 percent of China’s 
total economy and employed more 
than 70 percent of the labor force. 
Today, agriculture accounts for about 
10 percent of China’s economy and 
employs 35 percent of the labor 
force.9 This is a remarkable shift over a 
relatively short period of Chinese labor 
from agriculture to other industries and 
of people from rural areas to cities.
Yet despite these achievements, China 
still faces significant constraints in its 
agricultural land capacity, relative to its 
population size. China has 22 percent 
of the world’s total population but only 
7 percent of its arable land. To break 
the problem down further, China has 
approximately 300 million acres of 
arable land, covering 13 percent of its 
territory. This amounts to 0.67 acres per 
capita and is less than 40 percent of the 
per capita world average, one-eighth 
the US level, and one half that of India.10 
Resource availability for agriculture is 
a significant challenge, and one that 
makes innovation and the creative 
application of technology all the more 
important to China’s future.
But over the last 30 years, China 
has defied these very considerable 
constraints and managed to make 
tremendous gains 
in agricultural 
production. 
Agricultural output 
grew at an annual 
rate of 4.5 percent from 1981 to 
1990, 5.3 percent from 1991 to 2000, 
and 3.4 percent from 2001 to 2010, 
far exceeding the world average in 
agricultural output growth.11 Chinese 
agriculture has seen the establishment 
of sizable homegrown agribusinesses, 
alongside the presence of multinational 
firms such as DuPont Pioneer, 
Monsanto, Syngenta, and Deere.
Integration of modern agricultural 
innovations into Chinese agriculture 
can be seen in the rising productivity 
of a number of commodities. A leading 
example of this success is rice, an 
important staple in the Chinese diet. 
Hybrid rice development in China 
began in the 1960s, and has supported 
Change in Chinese agriculture has been driven by 
continued growth in consumer food markets.
an increase in yields that enabled rice 
production to grow even as rice-planting 
area decreased. Chinese rice yields 
tripled as rice hybrids were improved. 
This has contributed significantly to 
overall agricultural productivity growth 
in China. (see Figure 5)
Productivity in other agricultural 
commodities has increased in China as 
well, although it still lags leading yield 
levels globally in most commodities by a 
greater margin than for rice. 
Here are a few examples:
• Corn yields lag US levels by 40 to 50 
percent but have continued to rise 
significantly, increasing from about 
1 metric ton/hectare in 1960 to 6 
tons/hectare today.  
• Dairy yields per cow have increased 
in China from 0.4 metric tons/year 
in 1964 to about 4.2 metric tons/
year today. By contrast, US dairy 
yields went from 3.67 metric tons/
cow in 1964 to 10.1 metric tons/cow 
annually today.
• Soybean yields in China have 
increased from 0.8 metric tons/
hectare in 1964 to 1.8 metric tons/
hectare today. In 2013, US average 
soybean yields were 2.9 metric tons/
hectare, having risen from 1.53 
metric tons/hectare in 1964.
In spite of continued growth in 
agricultural output in China, some 
analysts do express concern about the 
future. One USDA report, for example, 
observed that the rapid growth in 
agricultural production in China of the 
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
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Source: USDA-ERS
Figure 5. Rice Yields, 1960-2013 (metric tons/hectare)
past few decades may not have been 
sustained in recent years.12  
Indeed, an example of the recent 
challenges to agricultural productivity 
growth in China can be seen quite 
vividly in the swine industry. In 1996, 
the United States and China each 
produced almost 1.2 tons of pork for 
each sow in their respective inventories. 
By 2012, however, the United States had 
increased its production per sow to 1.8 
tons, while China saw its output per sow 
fall by about 10 percent.13 
Whether China now faces a structural 
slowdown in agricultural productivity 
remains unclear, but it is important 
to weigh the implications of such a 
slowdown because of ongoing and 
future changes in food consumption. 
One-off events, such as animal disease 
and weather, may have cyclical impacts, 
but a larger concern Chinese leaders and 
planners must confront is whether gains 
from the previous era of reform and 
technology development and adoption 
have, at this point, been exhausted.  
Some economists argue that countries 
like China (and others, for that matter) 
can grow up to a point by importing 
(or imitating) practices pioneered over 
decades in other economies, such as the 
United States.14 After having acquired 
technologies and innovations from 
other places, the challenge for China 
would be to continue agricultural output 
growth while also developing a greater 
indigenous innovation capacity. 
Can the success story from rice 
technology, for example, be replicated 
across a range of other agricultural 
products? 
One indicator of recent Chinese 
agricultural innovation is the formation 
of farmer corporations, or farmer 
cooperatives (see Figure 6). These 
organizations have significant potential 
to play a role in the adoption and 
US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
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Source: Dr. Hongdong Guo, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
Figure 6. Number of Farmer Professional Cooperatives in China
diffusion of agricultural technologies 
and innovations. Scholars have labeled 
these entities “farmer professional 
cooperatives,” which are similar to 
cooperatives elsewhere in the world 
and include organizations that supply 
inputs, manage production, promote 
technology, and sometimes even engage 
in marketing.15  
The emergence of these newer farmer 
cooperatives has accelerated since 2006, 
when China passed a law providing 
further support for their formation. 
The number of farmer professional 
cooperatives in China is estimated to 
have increased to 900,000 in 2013 
from none prior to the adoption of this 
law. Farmer professional cooperatives 
are playing a significant role in the 
formation of larger scale enterprises, 
which can access more substantial 
capital for agricultural production 
and foster collaboration between 
agricultural entrepreneurs.
The influence of these cooperatives on 
production is seen in vegetable and fruit 
production in China, with production 
area growing from under five million 
hectares in the 1990s to almost 30 
million hectares today. Between 2005 
and 2012, fresh vegetable production 
has increased from 440 million tons to 
574 million tons, up 30 percent.16  China 
has transitioned from a country that was 
barely visible in international markets to 
that of a leading exporter of vegetables 
and fruits, with farmer professional 
cooperatives playing an important role 
in that evolution.  
In addition, technology has contributed 
substantially to the growth of Chinese 
vegetable and fruit production. For 
instance, greenhouse production has 
moved from less than 10,000 hectares 
in 1990 to about 3 million hectares 
today, with many greenhouse facilities 
integrating world-class technologies. 
The combination of strong domestic 
consumption growth and continued 
growth in exports is predicted to fuel 
increasing investment in vegetable and 
fruit production in coming years.17 
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Models for US-China Collaboration in Agricultural Innovation
As the above sections have shown, China and the United States have distinct differences with respect 
to agricultural innovation for a variety of 
reasons: 
• China is a population dense 
but arable land scarce country; 
the United States is an arable 
land abundant but population 
sparse country. This means that 
labor versus capital decisions in 
agriculture are weighed much 
differently in the two countries.
• China is 
working to 
maximize 
limited 
agricultural 
resources 
for domestic consumption; US 
agriculture looks to develop capacity 
for other countries, especially China.
• China is adopting and integrating 
modern agricultural innovations but 
struggling to make full and efficient 
use of them; the United States 
tends to pull much efficiency from 
technologies, as well as developing 
follow-on innovations.
• Adoption of agricultural innovations 
in China has significantly affected 
agricultural production growth in 
the last 25 years; the impact of 
agricultural innovation in the United 
States has been spread over a longer 
time period.
But these differences should, in fact, 
lead to promising opportunities to 
connect the US innovation engine 
to China’s need for the fruits of that 
innovation. Ultimately, China needs to 
deploy innovations more effectively, 
and further develop its own agricultural 
innovations. China, perhaps more than 
any other country, has the ability to 
deploy US and indigenous agricultural 
innovations on an unprecedented scale.  
Much US innovation in agricultural 
technology arises from early-stage 
businesses. And that 
means that identifying 
models of US-China 
innovation collaboration 
needs to begin with 
startups. 
Investing in early-stage agricultural 
technology businesses can be a means 
to solve two interrelated problems. 
First, it provides a pathway for 
Chinese investors to access promising 
technologies and the human capital 
behind them. Second, US funding 
mechanisms for early-stage agricultural 
technology businesses are relatively 
undeveloped, so there is room for 
Chinese venture capital. There may be 
a premium for first-movers willing to 
bear some risk. In contrast to sectors 
such as information technology or 
biotechnology that receive greater 
attention, agricultural innovation in the 
United States suffers from a lack of 
China, perhaps more than any other country, 
has the ability to deploy US and indigenous 
agricultural innovations on an unprecedented 
scale. 
a deep reserve of funding options for 
early-stage ventures. 
Indeed, the need for more investment 
activity in early-stage US agricultural 
technology businesses has been a focus 
of much discussion. For example, the 
Kauffman Foundation, a high-profile 
advocate of entrepreneurship in the 
United States, has recently called for 
higher levels of private investment in US 
agricultural technology.18 Such appeals 
are centered around the importance 
of setting agriculture on a path toward 
greater efficiency and sustainability, for 
both the United States and the world.
Agricultural 
technology 
innovation will 
be particularly 
important to China 
in animal protein 
supply chains. Dramatic increases in 
Chinese animal protein consumption 
over the next ten years will, as argued in 
earlier sections, put enormous pressure 
on animal and crop production, so the 
improvement and development of 
technologies that increase the efficiency 
and sustainability of such supply chains 
is vital.  
Early-stage agricultural technology 
activity in the US Midwest is particularly 
relevant to such needs. The region is 
home to the greatest concentration of 
animal protein supply chain activity in 
the United States and centers on the 
production of corn, the country’s biggest 
crop (see Figures 7a and 7b). 
As of 2012, the US Midwest produces 
more than $180 billion of raw 
agricultural products annually and 
produces the majority of US corn, 
soybeans, swine, beef, and eggs. It is 
also the primary source of agricultural 
exports to China. In addition, the region 
has extensive processing and agriculture 
value-added activity, resulting in 
thousands of food, feed, fuel, and 
specialty products derived from raw 
commodities.
The Midwest region has a strong 
concentration of public and private 
entities focused on developing 
agricultural technology. It is home to 
land grant public 
universities that 
provide a unique 
network of cutting-
edge basic and 
agricultural science 
platforms. There is, too, a concentration 
of agricultural businesses engaged 
in technology development at 
many different levels. The Midwest 
is a catalyst of US agricultural 
innovation, knowledge transfer, and 
entrepreneurship development. And yet 
it has much untapped and undeveloped 
potential for further investment-related 
activity. 
 
To illustrate, consider the geographic 
clusters of early-stage agricultural 
technology development in the 
Midwest. These include established 
public and private organizations that 
shape the environment for technology 
R&D and potential adoption: 
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Agricultural technology innovation will be 
particularly important to China in animal protein 
supply chains.
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Figure 7b. Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold (2012), Midwestern States
Figure 7a. US Corn Production and Midwestern Agricultural Production Value
Source: USDA 
• Des Moines/Ames, Iowa 
 ◦ DuPont Pioneer: plant science  
agricultural business 
 ◦ Iowa State University: land 
grant public university 
 ◦ Iowa State University Research 
Park: assistance and accessibili-
ty for early stage businesses 
 ◦ Iowa State University Agricul-
tural Entrepreneurship Initia-
tive: development program for 
agricultural entrepreneurs and 
agricultural innovation
• Omaha/Lincoln, Nebraska
 ◦ Valmont: infrastructure and 
irrigation equipment business  
 ◦ University of Nebraska: land 
grant public university 
 ◦ Nebraska Innovation Campus: 
support for early-stage compa-
nies 
 ◦ Water for Food Institute:         
research institute for achieving 
food security with less pressure 
on water resources 
 ◦ University of Nebraska Engler 
Agribusiness Entrepreneurship 
program: support and encour-
age entrepreneurship amongst 
students
• St. Louis, Missouri
 ◦ Monsanto: plant science agri-
cultural business 
 ◦ Bio-Research & Development 
Growth Park: bio-research 
facilities for emerging scientific 
enterprises 
 ◦ Danforth Plant Science Center: 
nonprofit scientific facility to 
increase understanding of plant 
biology 
• Champaign/Chicago, Illinois
 ◦ ADM: grain and oilseed process-
ing agricultural business 
 ◦ University of Illinois Urbana 
Champaign: land-grant public 
university 
 ◦ University of Illinois Research 
Park: assistance and accessibili-
ty for early stage businesses. 
By its nature, early-stage business 
activity is difficult to track. Inventors, 
entrepreneurs, and investors advance 
projects without extensive public 
disclosure, and personal networks are 
an important means of communication 
and development. To provide a 
proxy for the state of early-stage 
agricultural innovation activity in the 
Midwest, an analysis was conducted 
of business plans developed between 
2012 and 2014 at the Agricultural 
Entrepreneurship Initiative at Iowa State 
University. The dataset offered here 
is a snapshot of early-stage business 
development activity, much of it related 
to agricultural technology (see Table 1). 
This analysis revealed a robust 
stream of innovation occurring across 
the agricultural value chain, with 
concentrations of activity in areas 
that should be of interest to Chinese 
agricultural entities, such as animal 
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# of Plans % of Total
Animal Health & Management 56 21.5
Machinery 22 8.5
Decision Support Technologies 21 8.1
Production Agriculture 20 7.7
Food Science 18 6.9
Urban Agriculture 15 5.8
Agri-Tourism 11 4.2
Energy Efficiency 11 4.2
Feed Efficiency 9 3.5
Sustainable Production Systems 9 3.5
Precision Agriculture 7 2.7
Aquaculture 6 2.3
Crop Nutrition 6 2.3
Crop Protection 6 2.3
Environmental Mitigation, Manure 
Management
6 2.3
Land Management 5 1.9
Horticulture 4 1.5
Seeds & Genetics 4 1.5
International Ag Development 3 1.2
Biological Pest Control 2 0.8
Bionutrition 2 0.8
Biotechnology 2 0.8
Fertilizer Efficiency 2 0.8
Information Systems 2 0.8
Irrigation Efficiency 2 0.8
Product Sourcing 2 0.8
Soil Health 2 0.8
Bioenergy 1 0.4
Biomaterials 1 0.4
Integrated Pest Management 1 0.4
Robotics 1 0.4
Water Quality & Preservation 1 0.4
TOTAL 260 100
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health and management, decision 
support technologies, food science, 
energy efficiency, feed efficiency, 
sustainable production systems, and 
environmental mitigation and manure 
management. Some startups have 
in fact emerged from these business 
plans, including Scout Pro, Agriculture 
Concepts, and AccuGrain.
Below are four models that have 
the potential to attract US and 
Chinese investment and commercial 
collaboration in these types of 
agricultural innovations in the Midwest 
and beyond. Each model focuses 
on early-stage agricultural business 
development activities and also contains 
a central element: human capital. 
These four models are underpinned 
by the need to connect people to one 
another, but, most important, aim to 
do so in ways that assure that their 
collective knowledge and imagination 
is magnified and amplified. The 
opportunities encompassed by these 
four models would help to build US-
China linkages but also lead to greater 
indigenous agricultural innovation over 
time in both countries.
Model One: Joint Agriculture 
Opportunities Fund
Relatively few venture capital (VC) or 
private equity (PE) funds in the United 
States are focused exclusively on 
agricultural technology. One means for 
Chinese investors to play a role in US 
agricultural innovation, then, is through 
the creation of a fund with an explicit 
focus on technologies relevant to both 
US and Chinese agriculture. 
Table 1. Iowa State University Agricultural 
Entrepreneurship Initiative Business Plans
The central concept in this model is to 
pair Chinese investors with US investors 
in a relatively undeveloped segment of 
the US capital market. 
Proprietary deal flow is one factor 
influencing early stage investment 
success, thus a fund with a clear 
investment thesis related to joint US 
and Chinese agricultural technology 
value and a 
geographic 
focus that 
aligns with that thesis 
is important. Such a 
fund would usefully 
focus on a region, for 
example by concentrating 
its investments in the 
Midwest. 
There are 800 to 1,000 
active VC funds in the 
United States, with an 
average fund size of 
about $150 million. 
However, fund size varies 
considerably. In the most 
recent years, US VC funds 
cumulatively invested 
between $25 and $30 
billion a year in 3,500 to 
4,000 deals.  
VC deals in the United States have been 
most heavily concentrated in Silicon 
Valley, with up to 50 percent of total 
VC investment dollars in the country 
flowing to companies in northern 
California during some quarters. In 
the same way, the bulk of venture 
deals in the United States have been 
geared toward computer and software 
technology, high growth sectors since 
the 1980s when the VC industry itself 
was in its formative stages.
In the Midwest, the prime agricultural 
region in the United States, VC 
investments have grown from under 
$500 million in 1995 to $1.1 billion 
in 2013, yet the 
region remains 
underdeveloped 
relative to other parts of the 
United States in attracting 
VC funding. For instance, VC 
investing averaged $94.20 per 
capita in the United States in 
2013, but was just $17.02 per 
capita in the Midwest (see 
Table 2).19  
Venture investing in 
agricultural technology is not 
even broken out as a category 
in industry statistics in the 
United States. A search of 
the vFinance.com database 
of more than 1,000 venture 
funds yielded just 54 with 
agriculture indicated as one 
of their investment areas, and 
only six of these are located in 
the Midwest. But though it is nascent, 
the activity of agriculture-related 
venture investors is much richer in the 
Midwest than 10 or 15 years ago.  
Of course, VC is a subset of the larger PE 
asset class, which also includes buyouts 
and mezzanine investment activity. So 
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Midwest
(million)
US Total 
(million)
% of 
US
1995 $470 $8,022 5.9
1996 $736 $11,361 6.5
1997 $913 $15,097 6.1
1998 $1,645 $21,569 7.6
1999 $2,631 $54,908 4.8
2000 $5,777 $105,119 5.5
2001 $2,185 $40,967 5.3
2002 $977 $22,192 4.4
2003 $914 $19,626 4.7
2004 $712 $22,814 3.1
2005 $916 $23,554 3.9
2006 $1,010 $27,624 3.7
2007 $1,159 $32,003 3.6
2008 $1,364 $30,255 4.5
2009 $966 $20,336 4.8
2010 $1,364 $23,398 5.8
2011 $1,554 $29,764 5.2
2012 $1,419 $27,385 5.2
2013 $1,112 $29,580 3.8
Table 2. US Venture Capital Investments by Year
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers/
National Venture Capital Association
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there may be opportunities with some 
of these PE firms for investments from 
Chinese parties, although that would 
depend on the nature of the fund. For 
example, PE funds, particularly foreign 
investors, focused on US farmland 
investment are legally restricted in 
some states. States such as Wisconsin, 
South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska and Oklahoma 
have laws that restrict foreign ownership 
of farmland.  
Each state’s laws are distinct, but many 
of them date to the 1970s and were 
rooted in fears of a Japanese takeover of 
US real estate. 
 
A Joint Agriculture Fund may also be 
launched through an existing firm or 
by creating a new fund that uses the 
existing infrastructure of the firm. 
Alternatively, an entirely new firm could 
be formed. But in either case, a China-
focused agricultural technology fund in 
the United States would need to have 
an explicit focus on technologies that 
have potential in both markets. Chinese 
investors should expect a return on 
investment consistent with early stage 
funds (25 percent annualized return or 
Hypothetical Example of Early-Stage Investment by Joint Agriculture Fund
Events Issues
Problem Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) is a coronavirus 
that infects the cells lining the small intestine of a pig, 
causing severe diarrhea and dehydration. Older hogs 
mostly get sick and lose weight after being infected, 
whereas newborn piglets usually die within five days of 
contracting the virus.
PEDV was first discovered in Europe, but has become 
increasingly problematic in China and now the United 
States. PEDV has killed more than eight million American 
hogs, resulting in significant losses to swine producers 
and higher pork prices for consumers.
Opportunity An American scientist-entrepreneur has developed 
an assay to detect PEDV, and immunoassays to detect 
antibodies against PEDV in the blood of infected pigs. 
The idea is that laboratories using the technology will 
be able to more rapidly identify PEDV, enabling pork 
producers to limit losses.
Being able to rapidly diagnose a PEDV outbreak puts 
pork producers in a more powerful position. There are 
multiple causes of diarrhea, so fast confirmation of the 
PEDV enables appropriate action to be taken, including 
implementing strict biosecurity on affected swine farms.
Investment The Joint Agriculture Fund invests money in a company 
formed to commercialize the PEDV assay and immuno-
assay technology.
The Joint Agricultural Fund is a preferred shareholder 
in the company, exchanging capital for an ownership 
stake. The fund also plays an active role on the Board of 
Directors and in mentoring and developing an effective 
management team.
Scale-Up The company commercializes its first technologies, 
scales its sales and marketing capabilities and develops 
ongoing R&D for improvement of existing technologies 
and development of new ones.
The company works toward eventual cash-flow positive 
status while building an organization for both sales and 
operational execution and continued technology develop-
ment in both countries. The Joint Agriculture Fund plays 
a key role in helping the company establish a market 
presence in China.
Returns As the company provides value to the swine industry it 
increases enterprise value. The Joint Agriculture Fund’s 
equity stake in the company increases in value. Return 
on investment comes in the form of a) dividends paid 
to investors and/or b) a sale of the company.
The Joint Agriculture Fund provides unique value-added 
service to the company beyond capital by helping the 
company develop its technology and organization to suc-
ceed in both countries. The US market is about six million 
sows, while the Chinese market is 50 million sows.
more), but should also leverage linkages 
to Chinese agriculture that will magnify 
returns.
One lesson from other similar joint 
funds is that management of the 
fund should integrate US and Chinese 
agricultural expertise. Chinese 
investors may be limited partners in 
the fund itself, but personnel with deep 
experience and perspective on Chinese 
agriculture will be needed to help 
bring unique capacity to the portfolio 
companies and help them scale in both 
the United States and China. This model 
of a Joint Agriculture Fund can target 
investments at early-stage businesses as 
one form of investment. 
Depending on the business, such 
investments can take the form of “seed” 
capital (high potential, but unproven 
ideas or prototypes) or “series A” 
capital (proven business plans and core 
management teams).
The joint fund may also invest in roll-up 
opportunities, a term used by investors 
to describe a strategy of combining 
multiple small companies in the same 
market into a single entity. The goal of 
a roll-up is to help a small firm achieve 
critical mass and/or to reduce cost 
through economies of scale. Creative 
mergers may also have the effect of 
increasing the valuation multiples of 
the roll-up business compared to the 
smaller pre-roll-up parts.  
The underlying concept of this model is 
this: there are a plethora of early-stage 
companies in the United States and 
China that are working on analogous 
or similar ag-related products and 
technologies, operating in analogous 
markets but each in their own country, 
or are in possession of technologies, 
systems, and expertise that can be 
further leveraged in the other country.
So a fund will need to identify 
opportunities to invest in two analogous 
companies—one in each country—
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Midwestern VCs with demonstrated 
interest in agricultural technology 
Advantage Capital Partners, St. Louis, Missouri: 
Invests in entrepreneurial small businesses in 
communities that are underserved by tradi-
tional sources of capital.
AgVenture Alliance, Mason City, Iowa: A busi-
ness development organization for value-add-
ed agricultural ventures formed by a group of 
farmers and agriculture related individuals in 
northern Iowa.
Cultivian Ventures, Carmel, Indiana: Fund 
focused on high-tech opportunities in the food 
and agricultural sectors.
Iowa Farm Bureau Federation Rural Vitality 
Fund, West Des Moines, Iowa: Created as a 
part of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation in 
partnership with other organizations to sup-
port the financing needs of rural businesses.  
Linn Grove Ventures, Fargo, North Dakota: A VC 
fund focused on technology to feed nine billion 
people by 2050.
Nidus Partners, St. Louis, Missouri: Provides 
seed funding to commercialize promising tech-
nologies related to energy, including renew-
ables, storage, and bioconversion.
Open Prairie Ventures, Effingham, Illinois: 
Provides early and growth stage VC, merchant 
banking, and strategic planning services to 
firms in industries including agriculture. 
and bring them together for scaling 
in a cross-border fashion. Early-stage 
companies rarely have this type of 
capacity to think about, much less 
execute, multinational strategies. The 
challenge of doing so is, at root, one of 
resource limitations, time constraints, 
lack of relationships, language barriers, 
and lack of experience or perspective.  
Roll-ups by their nature are difficult 
and intensive to identify, difficult to put 
together, and challenging to execute 
over the long term. And that challenge 
is magnified when combining firms from 
two different countries. However, the 
opportunity in US ag-related technology 
for venture and equity investors is 
notable and significant. Building more 
direct ties and relationships across 
borders would afford the chance to 
build a truly transnational firm, and one 
that can grow with new and emerging 
opportunities for US-China agricultural 
collaboration, investment, and trade. 
Indeed, there are few richer 
environments through which Chinese 
investors can dive into the US culture 
of innovation and entrepreneurship 
than through early-stage capital. 
However, the combination of new 
ideas, undeveloped markets, and 
entrepreneurs with limited experience 
means that there will be high rates 
of failure. Still, this constant churn 
of failure, mixed with occasional and 
spectacular success, has been an 
important part of the dynamic system of 
US innovation, including in agricultural 
technology.
Discussions with an assortment of 
ag-focused venture and PE fund 
professionals by the author revealed 
a generally positive reception to the 
idea of investors from China. The 
nature of investing in the United States 
and elsewhere is heavily relationship-
oriented, so there is typically some 
caution to introducing a new potential 
business relationship. However, there 
is a considerable understanding in 
US agriculture of the potential cross-
border benefits of building a bridge 
between markets and investors in the 
two countries. But while state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have partnerships 
with many in US agriculture, the 
preference among US venture and PE 
professionals, at least, is to develop 
relationships with individual Chinese 
investors, as opposed to funds linked to 
sovereign vehicles or SOEs.
Model Two: US-China Agriculture 
Accelerator
An emerging trend in early stage 
investing in the United States is 
the formation of accelerators. 
Accelerators offer entrepreneurs various 
combinations of mentorship, work 
space, and funding. They may be housed 
at universities, community-oriented 
organizations, or private development 
and funding entities. 
The purpose of an accelerator is to 
immerse an entrepreneur in a fertile 
environment for early-stage companies. 
Companies that do so gain access to a 
robust network, other entrepreneurs 
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working through similar challenges, 
quality mentors, and potentially even 
seed capital.  
As with so many VC and PE funds, 
today’s US accelerators are heavily 
concentrated in the information 
technology (IT) sector and cluster 
around a few geographies where 
firms in that sector are concentrated. 
Accelerators that have garnered 
attention through success and profile 
include Idealab, Techstars, and Y 
Combinator, but accelerators are now 
emerging in geographies outside the 
major IT hubs.
Future accelerators will become much 
more focused on distinct niches; 
agriculture cannot be far behind, 
although there are currently no 
accelerators with an explicit agriculture 
focus. Such entities will likely serve 
verticals for which they can help the 
entrepreneur through specialization. 
In this context, an accelerator with a 
focus on agriculture and joint US-China 
opportunities is a clear example of 
the next generation development of 
accelerators in the United States.
This model suggests that Chinese 
investors would partner with a US-
based organization to launch a US-China 
Agriculture Accelerator—again, for 
example in the Midwest. The accelerator 
would offer office/lab/engineering 
space, access to mentors, skills training, 
a network of support, and connections 
to ag-related investors and customers in 
both countries but with an emphasis on 
the China market. The US and Chinese 
partners in the accelerator may take an 
equity stake in participating startups, 
charge ongoing participation fees, or 
charge success fees depending on the 
nature of participants in the program. 
The budget (three to five years) for an 
accelerator can be as low as $3 million 
or as high as $20 million, depending 
on the scope of the program and 
overhead expense structure. The ideal 
arrangement will encompass funding 
from both US and Chinese agricultural 
investors. 
Similar to the IT accelerators 
highlighted above, the joint ag-focused 
accelerator would work with early-
stage businesses. The staff, mentor, 
and investor network that will be at 
the core of the accelerator should 
have a unique combination of US and 
Chinese agriculturalists and focus on 
opportunities that are scalable in both 
countries.
In addition to early-stage businesses, 
the accelerator would also accept 
businesses that are formed to portage 
existing US agricultural technologies 
to China. This concept involves helping 
to leverage Chinese agricultural 
knowledge into new opportunities for 
existing US agricultural technology via 
the accelerator. The accelerator can 
enable entrepreneurs to tap into larger 
opportunities through its perspective on 
technology in both countries. 
The distinctive elements of this 
model involve a combination of a US 
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organization that brings connections to 
early-stage agricultural entrepreneurs 
and innovative agribusinesses alongside 
Chinese investors with an interest in 
agricultural innovation and experience 
in Chinese agribusiness. 
Potential US entities as partners for the 
accelerator could be the following: 
• Midwest (or other) universities 
with colleges of agriculture 
and incubation and technology 
commercialization activity and 
research parks.  
• Regional initiatives with an 
agricultural focus. These include but 
are not limited to the Cultivation 
Corridor in Des Moines, Iowa and 
the Kansas City Animal Health 
Corridor in Kansas City, Missouri.
• Not-for-profit organizations with 
missions related to Chinese 
agricultural needs, such as the 
Danforth Plant Science Center in St. 
Louis, Missouri.
Universities are particularly interesting 
potential partners in such an 
accelerator because of the opportunity 
to pursue entrepreneurial projects 
with combinations of US and Chinese 
faculty or students. Indeed, some 
Hypothetical Example of Projects by a US-China Agriculture Accelerator
Early Stage Business Existing US Agricultural Technology
0 Months
A US entrepreneur has developed a technology that 
significantly reduces the risk and incidence of e. coli and 
salmonella bacteria contamination during meat process-
ing. The technology has potential in the US market, but 
also in China as a means of improving food safety for 
processed meat products. The entrepreneur applies to 
the US-China Agriculture Accelerator and is accepted.
An established mid-sized US agribusiness has an ani-
mal feed ingredient technology for increased poultry 
feed efficiency. The patented ingredient has gained US 
industry acceptance, with a 30 percent market share 
in the egg laying chicken industry and 25 percent 
market share in the broiler chicken industry. The US 
company thinks the product has potential in China but 
doesn’t know how to approach the opportunity so it 
applies to the US-China Agriculture Accelerator and is 
accepted.
0 to 6 Months
The entrepreneur moves into the accelerator office 
and gets $100,000 in seed funding in exchange for a 10 
percent equity stake in the company by the acceler-
ator. Accelerator staff works intensively with him on 
commercialization strategy and engineering. Staff also 
works closely with him to identify potential customers in 
both markets. 
The US agribusiness assigns an employee to lead the 
spin-off business at the accelerator. Patent rights to 
the technology for China are assigned to the spin-off 
business. The agribusiness contributes $50,000 to the 
project as does the accelerator. The accelerator re-
ceives a 10 percent equity stake in the new business. 
Accelerator staff works closely with the business to 
identify Chinese staff, connect it with potential cus-
tomers in China, develop a commercialization strategy, 
and identify potential Chinese partners.
7 to 12 Months
The entrepreneur completes a business plan, and 
accelerator staff assists with connections to interested 
investors. A coalition of Chinese and US investors invests 
$5 million in the business. Ownership of the business is 
50 percent investors, 45 percent founder, and 5 percent 
accelerator.
The staff of the spin-off business, now one Amer-
ican and one Chinese professional, completes the 
business plan. Accelerator staff continues to assist 
with connections to potential investors and partners. 
Ultimately, a Chinese meat processing equipment 
company becomes the investor and partner for the 
business. Ownership in the business is 47.5 percent US 
agribusiness, 47.5 percent Chinese meat processing 
equipment business, and 5 percent accelerator.
High Profile Accelerators in the 
United States
• Idealab: An early template for 
accelerators was this Pasadena, 
California-based accelerator started 
by Bill Gross in 1996. Idealab itself 
usually comes up with the ideas for 
new businesses then recruits outside 
people to bring them to fruition. 
Idealab takes a significant equity stake 
of participating companies, but also 
invests significant capital. Idealab 
has started and operated more than 
125 companies with 40 initial public 
offerings and acquisitions.
• Techstars: This accelerator provides 
$118,000 in seed funding to 
entrepreneurial teams accepted into 
its program through a competitive 
application process, intensive 
mentorship, and a network of mentors 
and alumni. Locations include Austin, 
TX, Boston, MA, Boulder, CO, Chicago, 
IL, New York City, NY and Seattle, 
WA. In exchange, Techstars gets 7-10 
percent equity ownership in the 
companies. Techstars reports that of 
the 292 participating companies, each 
average over $2 million in follow-on 
investment, 228 are still active, and 35 
have been acquired.
• Y Combinator: Y Combinator invests 
$120,000 in a large number of startups 
(most recently 68) biannually. The 
startups move to Silicon Valley for three 
months, during which Y Combinator 
works intensively with them to get the 
company into the best possible shape 
and refine their pitch to investors. Each 
cycle culminates in Demo Day, when 
the startups present their companies to 
a carefully selected, invite-only investor 
audience. Since 2005, Y Combinator 
has funded more than 700 startups 
with a current valuation of over $20 
billion. 
universities, such as Purdue University 
in West Lafayette, Indiana, have 
even developed venture vehicles to 
commercialize university innovations. In 
addition, there are a number of latent 
patented agricultural technologies at 
US universities that are available for 
licensing. Entrepreneurs hosted by a 
prospective joint US-China accelerator 
could develop plans to license and 
commercialize these technologies in 
China. 
Model Three: University Student 
Incubators
Another sensible and mutually            
beneficial opportunity for Chinese         
investment in US-based agricultural 
innovation is the development and 
launch of student incubators at universi-
ties. There are nearly 500 such student 
incubators in the United States, a trend 
supported by the development of entre-
preneurship classes, related programs, 
and subject majors at many universities. 
Student incubators support the develop-
ment of startup and fledgling companies 
by providing student entrepreneurs 
with an array of targeted resources 
and services. These services are usually 
developed or orchestrated by incubator 
management and offered both in the 
student incubator and through its net-
work of contacts, often alumni. A stu-
dent incubator’s main goal is to produce 
successful startup businesses that will 
leave the program financially viable. 
Entrepreneurship activity at some US 
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universities is, in fact, quite significant. 
A survey of Iowa State University grad-
uates who had received bachelor’s 
degrees between 1982 and 2006, for 
example, found that 15.1 percent of 
all graduates had started at least one 
for-profit company, and 20.1 percent of 
those who graduated from the College 
of Agriculture and Life Sciences had 
done so.20  
In fact, the early cohort of graduates 
from the agriculture college included 
more than 30 percent of graduates who 
were now entrepreneurs. And these 
alumni entrepreneurs from this time pe-
riod created companies that collectively 
did $64 billion in revenue annually and 
employed almost 225,000 people.  
This is precisely why building ties to 
aspiring entrepreneurs at American 
universities by funding a student incu-
bator is a means for Chinese investors 
to tap into developments in US-based 
agricultural innovation. Such an invest-
ment model differs from Models One 
and Two in that it would involve an 
indirect investment. The goal of funding 
a university-based student incubator is 
the creation of proprietary deal flow, 
and also the identification and develop-
ment of entrepreneurial talent. If done 
properly, university-based student incu-
bators dedicated to US-China agriculture 
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US-China Agriculture Student Incubator Activities
Founding Chinese investor(s) receive proposals from universities for creating US-China Agriculture Student 
Incubators. Funding provides for five years and $500,000 total investment per incubator. Univer-
sities are selected, including a university that will house the student incubator at its College of 
Agriculture. The university has existing student incubator activity for agricultural businesses, but 
this funding will enable further development of those activities with a focus on teams of Chinese 
and US students with prospective business potential in both countries. The university designates 
two faculty members to direct the program as well as alumni entrepreneurs to provide mentoring 
and support.
Fall Academic Term A competitive application process results in three student entrepreneur teams being selected. One 
of the teams consists of a) a US agriculture student, b) a Chinese agriculture student, and c) a Chi-
nese software engineering student. The student team wants to develop an application for a tablet 
computer that enables crop scouts to identify pests (insects, weeds, plant diseases) and record 
scouting data that can be shared with agronomists and farmers for more effective pest diagnosis 
and treatment. The student team has a prototype for US corn that is being tested, but funds from 
the incubator will support further development with the support of university plant pathologists. In 
addition, the funds will support development of a version appropriate for China, involving collabo-
ration with plant pathologists from a Chinese university.
Spring Academic Term The student team has collaborated with US and Chinese university plant pathologists to create the 
alpha version of the corn scouting application. In addition, the student team has worked closely 
with Incubator mentors to define its value proposition, articulate its initial business model, and 
develop a marketing and sales strategy. The application is launched in time for spring planting of 
corn in both China and the United States with 20 professional crop scouting organizations signing 
up for the pilot release.
Next Year The pilot release of the corn scouting application is a success, with the startup company demon-
strating value and generating revenue. The startup completes a business plan and a proposal for $2 
million in equity capital to scale the company, develop applications for other crops, and build the 
organization.
Hypothetical Example of a US-China Agriculture Student Incubator 
startups will generate investment-ready 
businesses at a relatively low cost.
Midwest land grant universities are a 
target-rich environment because of 
the opportunity to pursue incubation 
projects with both US and Chinese 
agriculture students. Many of them, as 
the Iowa State University survey demon-
strates, are also aspiring entrepreneurs. 
This model calls for creating a student 
incubator with an explicit goal of sup-
porting development of startup busi-
nesses created by teams of American 
and Chinese students. 
Universities with the most potential as 
partners will likely be those with a com-
bination of entrepreneurship, business, 
and agribusiness programs, which also 
have a record of business incubation 
and technology commercialization. In 
addition, those US universities with 
faculty and students from China with an 
interest and expertise in agriculture and 
related fields will be strong potential 
partners. Depending on the relationship, 
there is the longer term potential of es-
tablishing cross-border student incuba-
tors on both US and Chinese campuses.
Model Four: Emerging Africa 
Agriculture Fund
In team sports, the term “home field 
advantage” describes the advantage 
that the home team is said to have over 
the visiting team as a result of playing in 
familiar facilities and in front of sup-
portive fans. The alternative to playing 
on the team’s home field is to pick a 
neutral field, where neither team has 
an obvious advantage. One can apply 
this neutral field metaphor to a fourth 
model of US-China investment in agri-
cultural innovation—namely, investing 
in third-party agriculture projects, for 
instance in Africa. 
Agriculture in Africa is currently seiz-
ing the attention of its own and other 
governments, local and international 
business leaders, communities, and 
development partners such as bilateral 
and multilateral donors. In recent years, 
many have called Africa the world’s 
“last agricultural frontier.” Significant 
economic growth in many parts of 
Africa over the last five to ten years has 
yielded rising urban middle classes and 
increased demand for more and better 
locally sourced foods, energy, water, 
infrastructure, housing, and sanitation.
This rapidly emerging opportunity for 
agribusiness investors in Africa has been 
a focus of Rabobank, a leading interna-
tional agricultural bank. Take this assess
ment from Piet Moerland, chairman of 
Rabobank’s board:
No region of the world offers more excite-
ment, complexity, and opportunity [for] 
global food and agriculture than Sub-Sa-
haran Africa. Over the past decade, the 
hidden food and agriculture potential of 
this region has become better understood, 
but the challenge of achieving sustained 
growth and development in African food 
and agriculture remains unmet. Sub-Saha-
ran Africa possesses the natural resources 
advantages needed to build effective food 
and agriculture industries, but in some 
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instances lacks the know-how, experience, 
and the enabling environment to get it 
done.21  
There is tremendous underdeveloped 
agricultural production capacity in 
Africa, but that capacity needs to be 
put onto a pathway of sustained growth 
and more rapid productivity increas-
es. Agriculture—more than any other 
industry—has the potential to reinforce 
Africa’s transition toward global eco-
nomic relevance at the macro level, and 
to drive income growth and reduce pov-
erty at the individual level. The World 
Bank estimates that by 2030, agriculture 
could be a $1 trillion industry in sub-Sa-
haran Africa.22 The possibility of shifting 
parts of Africa from net food importers 
to exporters is not outside the realm of 
possibility.
Now is a unique moment for Chinese 
and American agriculturalists and 
investors to jointly explore ways to be 
involved in developing Africa’s private 
agribusiness sector. Indeed, in many 
ways, everything in Africa has been tried 
already except for the development of 
a sustainable private sector, particularly 
beyond primary agricultural production. 
This should include creating local agri-
businesses that support farmers (in-
puts and services) as well as those that 
improve and develop markets through 
processing and value-added activities.  
There are an increasing number of busi-
ness plans that have been developed 
by US agricultural entrepreneurs for 
farming and agribusiness investments 
in various countries in Africa. And Africa 
has very quietly built up a capacity for 
billions in agriculture-related invest-
ment. A proper and effective model 
would combine Chinese capital, US 
agribusiness and technology know-how, 
and local African agriculture partners 
to more rapidly increase the rate of 
productivity gains in commercial agricul-
ture. US-China relationships, sharing of 
expertise, and investment history could 
thus be leveraged on a neutral field.
This model could, for example, take 
the form of a US-China Emerging Africa 
Agriculture Fund, focused on early-stage 
projects in the $5 to $15 million equi-
ty capital range. There are a variety of 
funds appropriate for larger, more devel-
oped agriculture projects but few, if any, 
geared toward early-stage, greenfield 
projects at this time. Most countries 
in Africa have relatively undeveloped 
agriculture economies and agribusi-
ness sectors, so greenfield projects are 
necessary but occupy the high risk/high 
reward part of the investment spectrum. 
Broad parameters for an Emerging Afri-
ca Agriculture Fund include:
• Involvement of both Chinese and US 
agriculturalists as investors. It could 
be set up as a new firm, or a new 
fund for an existing firm.
• Leveraging investment from both 
the African and Asian development 
banks and, where appropriate, posi-
tion for later stage investment from
• The World Bank/International Fi-
nance Corporation and possibly even 
from the nascent BRICS Bank.
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• Initial capitalization of $50 to $100 
million, targeting investment in 10 to 
15 projects.
• Targeting businesses where manage-
ment can include a mix of African, 
American, and Chinese members, 
and where linkages to US and Chi-
nese agricultural businesses are 
important. (For example, a US or 
Chinese equipment supplier may 
be important or a US or Chinese 
company may be a customer for an 
export product from Africa.)
• Support by in-house or contracted 
commercial agribusiness advisors 
with extensive practical experience 
in adapting agricultural technologies 
in emerging markets and in Africa’s 
agriculture-related regulatory, policy, 
and stakeholder engagement.
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Figure 8: Agricultural Business Park Schematic in Ghana (Tongu Ranch)
Source: Heartland Global, Inc. 
Clusters and Parks in Action
One US business championing farm and agri-
business clusters and business parks is Heart-
land Global, Inc. in Johnston, Iowa. For ex-
ample, the company is already working with 
a Ghanaian local food company, the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture, the Irrigation Devel-
opment Authority, and other local and global 
agribusinesses to develop an agricultural 
business park in the Volta region of the coun-
try (see Figure 8). The investment opportu-
nity, currently in the design phase, aims to 
convert a 63,000 acre former government 
ranch property that has fallen into disuse 
into a hub of modern farming and agricultur-
al processing. The design includes local food 
value chains and production and processing 
for export. American, South American and 
Ghanaian farm and agribusiness investors 
are engaged in this development. Heartland 
Global seeks to develop “economic zone” or 
“inland port” status to ease the movement 
of products and inputs in and out of the 
cluster. In addition, the company is engaged 
in discussions of analogous projects in DRC, 
Malawi, and elsewhere on the continent.
The Emerging Africa Agriculture Fund 
might target high potential projects 
without a particular focus. Alternative-
ly, the fund may develop a focus on a 
region or a particular industry segment.  
Africa is an enormous continent with a 
diverse and large agricultural opportu-
nity set, and the convergence of those 
opportunities with the interests and 
expertise of a US-China combination 
may require a narrower focus and scope 
for the fund at the outset. 
One example of a potential focus is 
“farm and agribusiness clusters” or 
“business parks,” which are a relatively 
new agricultural development concept 
in Sub-Saharan African countries such 
as Ghana, Kenya, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The concept of an 
agricultural business park is to cluster 
a mix of agricultural input, production, 
conversion, and processing activities to-
gether in a contiguous geographic space. 
An analogy is an urban or suburban real 
estate development, but, in this case, 
geared toward accelerated develop-
ment of entire agricultural value chains 
where small farmers, large farmers, and 
agribusinesses can co-locate and have 
the advantage of pre-developed infra-
structure such as roads, rail, and power. 
Other relevant analogies are manufac-
turing clusters or industrial parks in the 
United States or special economic zones 
in China.
Agricultural clusters or business parks 
are often designed, at least initially, 
as public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
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Excluded Model: Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A)
In 2013, Chinese Shuanghui Group acquired 
Smithfield Foods, the largest pork producer 
in the United States. With this $7 billion deal, 
Shuanghui increased its US pig production 
from zero to almost 16 million animals a year. 
Pork can be sold in the US domestic market or 
be sold in China, leveraging the knowledge and 
infrastructure of a company in China to get it 
done. Shuanghui, through the deal, gained a 
US management team with tremendous exper-
tise and a company that had developed scale 
economies in pork production, slaughter, and 
delivery over the course of decades.
This is an example of an M&A model that some 
expect to become more common between 
large agribusiness companies in China and the 
United States. While this may well be true, this 
paper omits such a model.  
Multi-billion dollar deals like that between 
Shuanghui and Smithfield tend to abide by 
a complex logic particular to each deal. It is 
difficult to point to transactions of this nature 
and magnitude as a complete solution to 
either China’s need for agricultural innovation 
or US agriculture’s need for capital. In addition, 
the US agricultural innovation engine is fueled 
by a complex network of people and organiza-
tions. And much of the truly ground-breaking 
innovation occurs at a grassroots level. Large 
agricultural businesses in both countries will 
continue to play an important role in agricul-
tural innovation, but in all likelihood their role 
will be heavier in the adaptation and commer-
cialization of innovation rather than early-stage 
development. 
This is why some larger businesses also have 
their own venture funds, or make a habit of 
acquiring early-stage companies and their 
breakthrough innovations. Major and mature 
players naturally gravitate toward excellence in 
execution than focus on the messy business of 
developing the next disruptive technology.  
because they need to align with nation-
al priorities. The government tends to 
play a pivotal role in the designation of 
appropriate land for development, leads 
dialogue with local communities, com-
mit to finance infrastructure and, where 
appropriate, creates investment incen-
tives. There is a project or site manager 
that plays the role of general contractor 
and developer to design the site, build 
infrastructure, recruit early tenants for 
“crowding-in” farm investors, proces-
sors, input suppliers, and others.  
The agricultural business park can 
evolve as a pod of modern agriculture 
for a mix of foreign and local commer-
cial farmers, agriculturalists, and agri-
businesses. Investors in the park may 
achieve returns through ongoing profits 
from the development, as well as via 
trade opportunities. 
There may also be opportunities to 
leverage private sector investment with 
public funds and projects. Infrastructure 
projects for roads, power, and irrigation 
may be aligned with fund activities. 
Projects funded by the World Bank or 
the recently formed BRICS Bank may be 
attractive PPP opportunities, for exam-
ple. US government initiaves, such as 
Feed the Future Initiative, supported by 
GrowAfrica, and the New Alliance with 
GEF, aim to increase agricultural produc-
tion and private sector participation in 
targeted countries, including eleven in 
Africa. This is another example of a PPP 
that can be leveraged by the fund.  
At the US-Africa Leadership Summit in 
summer 2014, the US public and pri-
vate sectors committed over $37 billion 
to the African continent, in an effort 
viewed by some as an attempt to “catch 
up” to Chinese investments. The second 
10 years of the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program and 
the renewed UN Millennium Develop-
ment goals will also continue to ensure 
ongoing government support for sus-
tainable agricultural intensification in 
various African countries.  
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Conclusion 
The rise of the Chinese consumer has been one of the most important drivers of change in 
global agriculture in the last 25 years, 
and that process is only starting. 
Combined with the emergence of 
middle-class food consumption habits 
across emerging markets, this trend has 
yielded new demands on agricultural 
production systems that represent one 
of the most important economic and 
environmental challenges of the next 50 
years.  
Agricultural technology and innovation 
have been and will continue to be 
the principal means to meet these 
challenges. Producing more food with 
fewer resources, while mitigating 
natural resource degradation, will 
not occur without a virtuous cycle of 
creating and adopting new technologies, 
methods, and systems.
This paper has suggested four models, 
or opportunities, that have the potential 
to attract US-China investment and 
commercial collaboration. These 
models focus on early-stage agricultural 
business development activities, 
representing a new element of US-
China engagement, especially by (but 
not necessarily limited to) the private 
sector. While M&A activity between 
US and Chinese agribusiness and 
food companies may continue to be 
an important part of strengthening 
agricultural ties, collaborative early-
stage commercial activity promises 
to deliver more enduring impact. 
Connecting investors, business people, 
and entrepreneurs from both countries 
will build collective knowledge and 
imagination, resulting in greater 
indigenous agricultural innovation over 
time in both countries. If successful and 
sustainable, this kind of collaboration 
will be the world’s gain.
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US-China Investments in Agricultural Innovation and New Technologies
There are compelling incentives for the United States and China to increase direct 
investment in both directions. US FDI stock in China was roughly $60 billion in 2010, yet 
a variety of obstacles and barriers to further American investment remain. Meanwhile, 
Chinese FDI stock in the United States has hovered at around just $5 billion. For China, 
investing in the United States offers the opportunity to diversify risk from domestic 
markets while moving up the value-chain into higher-margin industries. And for the 
United States, leveraging Chinese capital could, in some sectors, help to create and 
sustain American jobs.
As a nonprofit institution, The Paulson Institute does not participate in any investments. 
But by taking a sector-by-sector look at opportunities and constraints, the Institute 
has begun to highlight commercially promising opportunities—and to convene 
relevant players from industry, the capital markets, government, and academia around 
economically rational and politically realistic investment ideas.
The Institute’s goal is to focus on specific and promising sectors rather than treating 
the question of investment abstractly. We currently have two such sectoral efforts—on 
agribusiness and manufacturing.
The Institute’s aim is to help develop sensible investment models that reflect economic 
and political realities in both countries.
The Paulson Institute currently has four investment-related programs: 
US-China Agribusiness Program
The Institute’s agribusiness programs aim to support America’s dynamic agriculture 
sector, which needs new sources of investment to spur innovation and create jobs. 
These programs include:
• A US-China Agricultural Investment Experts Group comprised of some of the leading 
names in American agribusiness. The group brainstorms ideas and helps in the 
Institute’s effort to develop innovative investment models that reflect economic and 
technological changes in global agriculture.
• Periodic agribusiness-related investment workshops, bringing key players and 
companies together. The Institute held the first workshop in Beijing in December 
2012, whose attendees included numerous CEOs and experts. It has since held 
smaller, sessions in the United States focused on specific technologies or aspects of 
agribusiness.
The Paulson Institute’s Program on Cross-Border Investment
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• Commissioned studies that propose specific investment models, including for 
commodities, such as pork, or value chain opportunities, such as collaborative 
research and development (R&D).
US-China Manufacturing Program
In June 2013, the Institute launched a program on trends that will determine the future 
of global manufacturing and manufacturing-related capital flows. We aim to identify 
mutually beneficial manufacturing partnerships that would help support job growth in 
the United States. The Institute’s principal manufacturing programs include:
• Investment papers that the Institute is co-developing with private sector and 
academic partners.
• Periodic workshops in Beijing and Chicago with Chinese, American and global CEOs 
and executives, focused on technological change, sectoral trends, and investment 
opportunities.
Case Study Program
The Institute publishes in-depth historical case studies of past Chinese direct 
investments in the United States, examining investment structures and economic, 
political, and business rationales. These detailed studies are based on public sources 
but also first-hand interviews with deal participants on all sides. They aim to reconstruct 
motivations and actions, and then to draw lessons learned.
State-Level Competitiveness Program
The Institute works closely with several US governors to help them hone their teams’ 
approach to attracting job-creating foreign direct investment. Our core competitiveness 
program is a partnership with states in the Great Lakes region, but we work with other 
governors as around the United States as well.
• Paulson Institute-Great Lakes Governors Partnership: Working closely with the 
Council of Great Lakes Governors, the Institute is honing pilot strategies to help 
match the “right” investors and recipients to the “right” sectoral opportunities. 
Work is also focusing on how to connect Great Lakes/St. Lawrence-based R&D and 
innovation to foreign deployment opportunities while opening markets in China. The 
Council includes the governors of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as the Canadian premiers of Ontario and 
Quebec.
• American Competitiveness Dialogues: The Institute convenes an ongoing series 
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of competitiveness forums around the United States. These aim to address the 
implications of the changing global economy for US competitiveness, opportunities 
and challenges associated with foreign direct investment.
• R&D+Deployment (“R&D+D”): Working with partners, including McKinsey & 
Company and a small number of universities, the Institute is exploring new models 
that would link Chinese investors to the US innovation engine, especially in areas 
linked to demand-side needs in the China market. The aim is to design fresh models 
that capture value in both countries but do not sacrifice America’s innovation edge 
or intellectual property protection. Our dialogue in this area aims, ultimately, to lead 
to a pilot initiative.
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The Paulson Institute, an independent center located at the University of Chicago, is 
a non-partisan institution that promotes sustainable economic growth and a cleaner 
environment around the world. Established in 2011 by Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former 
US Secretary of the Treasury and chairman and chief executive of Goldman Sachs, 
the Institute is committed to the principle that today’s most pressing economic and 
environmental challenges can be solved only if leading countries work in complementary 
ways.
For this reason, the Institute’s initial focus is the United States and China—the world’s 
largest economies, energy consumers, and carbon emitters. Major economic and 
environmental challenges can be dealt with more efficiently and effectively if the United 
States and China work in tandem.
Our Objectives
Specifically, The Paulson Institute fosters international engagement to achieve three 
objectives:
• To increase economic activity—including Chinese investment in the United 
States—that leads to the creation of jobs. 
• To support urban growth, including the promotion of better environmental 
policies.
• To encourage responsible executive leadership and best business practices on 
issues of international concern. 
Our Programs
The Institute’s programs foster engagement among government policymakers, corporate 
executives, and leading international experts on economics, business, energy, and the 
environment. We are both a think and “do” tank that facilitates the sharing of real-world 
experiences and the implementation of practical solutions. 
Institute programs and initiatives are focused in five areas: sustainable urbanization, 
cross-border investment, climate change and air quality, conservation, and economic 
policy research and outreach. The Institute also provides fellowships for students 
at the University of Chicago and works with the university to provide a platform for 
distinguished thinkers from around the world to convey their ideas.
About The Paulson Institute 
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